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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
 
. 
In 2006 Mario Mendoza pleaded guilty to an 
aggravated felony and, as a result, now faces imminent 
removal from the United States. He appeals from the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey’s order 
denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which 
he sought to vacate his plea due to his counsel’s failure to 
apprise him that his conviction would lead to deportation. For 
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the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
I. 
 
 Mendoza was born in Ecuador and lives in New 
Jersey. From 1996 to 2001, while working as a licensed 
realtor, he helped borrowers obtain federally insured 
mortgages. His behavior led the government to charge him 
with conspiring to fraudulently induce the Federal Housing 
Authority to insure mortgage loans, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 371 and 1001. Mendoza’s counsel, Glen Cavanagh, 
explained to him he could avoid prison by pleading guilty. 
Cavanagh did not, however, apprise Mendoza that, as an 
aggravated felony, his crime would lead to mandatory 
deportation. See
 
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
 Mendoza entered his plea on March 29, 2006. Prior to 
sentencing on September 11, 2006, Mendoza learned from his 
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that his conviction 
might result in removal. The District Court sentenced 
Mendoza to two years’ probation and ordered him to pay 
$100,000 in restitution. As a condition of his probation, 
Mendoza was required to cooperate with immigration 
officials. 
 
Sometime after Mendoza received his sentence, the 
government instituted removal proceedings and ordered him 
to leave the country. On January 14, 2010, after completing 
his sentence, Mendoza filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 and Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to vacate his sentence and withdraw his plea. In it, 
Mendoza contended that Cavanagh did not warn him of the 
immigration implications of pleading guilty to an aggravated 
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felony and noted that it was an open question whether a 
lawyer renders constitutionally deficient performance by 
failing to highlight a plea’s immigration consequences. On 
March 31, 2010, the Supreme Court answered that question in 
the affirmative. See Padilla v. Kentucky
 
, 130 S. Ct. 1473 
(2010). Five months later, on September 9, 2010, Mendoza 
withdrew his motion to vacate his plea.  
Nine months after that, on June 8, 2011, Mendoza 
repackaged these same arguments in a petition for a writ of 
error coram nobis. Mendoza contended that, had he been 
aware that a guilty plea would subject him to deportation, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have instead 
attempted to negotiate a better deal or risked trial. On 
September 21, 2011, after noting the issue of Mendoza’s 
counsel’s ineffectiveness, the District Court denied 
Mendoza’s petition on the alternative grounds that he filed 
after an unreasonable delay and did not assert his innocence. 
Mendoza timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the petition 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), in aid of its jurisdiction pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We review the District Court’s legal conclusions de 
novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States 
v. Orocio
 
, 645 F.3d 630, 635 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III. 
 
Notwithstanding Mendoza’s counsel’s deficient 
performance, we agree with the District Court that Mendoza’s 
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unreasonable delay in filing his coram nobis petition 
forestalls his efforts to seek relief. The rare remedy of a writ 
of error coram nobis may be “used to attack allegedly invalid 
convictions which have continuing consequence, when the 
petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer ‘in 
custody’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” United States v. 
Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105-106 (3d Cir. 1989). Such relief 
is appropriate, however, only “[(a)] to correct errors for which 
there was no remedy available at the time of trial and [(b)] 
where ‘sound reasons’ exist for failing to seek relief earlier.” 
Id. at 106 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 
512 (1954)). This “sound reason” standard is even stricter 
than that used to evaluate § 2255 petitions. Id. Indeed, “‘it is 
difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case 
today where a writ of coram nobis would be necessary or 
appropriate.’” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 
(1996) (quoting United States v. Smith
 
, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 
(1947)). 
Although Mendoza’s counsel’s deficient performance 
may have precluded him from seeking relief at the time of his 
plea, Mendoza cannot show any “sound reasons” for his 
lengthy delay in seeking relief since that time. Mendoza 
became aware of his plea’s deportation consequences in 
September 2006 via his PSR, yet did not allege until 2010 
that his counsel was ineffective. He attributes this four-year 
delay to a combination of: (a) his (mistaken) belief that his 
cooperation with immigration officials would stave off his 
deportation, and (b) the absence of Supreme Court precedent 
regarding a counsel’s duty to warn of a plea’s immigration 
consequences—only after the Supreme Court decided Padilla, 
Mendoza contends, could he have known that his counsel was 
ineffective.  
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These are not “sound reasons.” First, Mendoza’s 
cooperation was a condition of his probation, not of his 
remaining in the country, and any indications to the contrary 
were not of the government’s making. Second, we have held 
that Padilla did not create a “new rule” for retroactivity 
purposes precisely because lawyers in the Third Circuit have 
long been expected to advise clients of a plea’s deportation 
implications. See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 640 (“Lower court 
decisions not in harmony with Padilla were, with few 
exceptions, decided before 1995 and pre-date the professional 
norms that . . . had long demanded that competent counsel 
provide advice on the removal consequences of a client’s 
plea.”).1 Indeed, Orocio
                                              
1 On April 30, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the issue of whether Padilla created a “new rule,” 
see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989), and thus, 
would not apply retroactively on collateral review. See 
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012) (No. 11-820). Although 
this question has split the circuits, compare Orocio, 645 F.3d 
630 (holding that Padilla is retroactive), with Chaidez, 655 
F.3d 684 (holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively) 
and United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 
2011) (same), its resolution has no bearing on Mendoza’s 
claim, which falls short regardless. If the Supreme Court were 
to overrule Orocio and conclude that Padilla did, in fact, 
create a “new rule,” such a ruling may strengthen Mendoza’s 
argument that he was previously unaware of the rule, but 
would also preclude him from invoking Padilla retroactively, 
effectively foreclosing his claim. See, e.g., Orocio, 645 F.3d 
at 637-641. 
 involved a petition for a writ of error 
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coram nobis based on facts almost identical to those here, 
except Orocio filed his petition alleging deficient 
performance before the Supreme Court decided Padilla, based 
on existing precedent, and did so immediately upon learning 
of his impending deportation. Mendoza was not as diligent. 
Mendoza has known of the threat of removal since at least 
2006, and his § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction because 
of ineffective assistance—filed six months before Padilla was 
decided and a full year-and-a-half before his present 
petition—demonstrated that he did not need the Supreme 
Court’s clarification to have raised his present contentions. 
That the law is unsettled does not justify a delay in filing a 
coram nobis petition, cf. Bousley v. United States
 
, 523 U.S. 
614, 623 (1998) (“[F]utility cannot constitute cause . . . if it 
means simply that a claim was unacceptable to that particular 
court at that particular time.” (quotation omitted)), nor does 
the record reveal any other “sound reason” for waiting so 
long to seek relief.  
Finally, even if Mendoza had properly and timely 
raised his ineffective assistance claims, we note that his 
underlying efforts to withdraw his plea would almost 
certainly fail. To withdraw a plea of guilty, a defendant must: 
(1) demonstrate strong reasons for the withdrawal (2) assert 
his innocence, and (3) show that the withdrawal will not 
unduly prejudice the government. See United States v. Jones, 
336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States 
v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 711 (3d Cir. 1989)). Cavanagh’s 
egregious error and Mendoza’s looming removal surely 
constitute a strong reason to withdraw the plea. See United 
States v. Trott, 779 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing how 
allegations of a plea’s involuntariness relate only to the 
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strength of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawal). But 
Mendoza has not asserted his innocence; rather, he has 
claimed merely that he would have sought a more favorable 
plea deal or risked trial. It does not appear that such a 
speculatively favorable plea deal existed, nor that a trial 
would have resulted in anything less than a conviction for an 
aggravated felony. More importantly, the government would 
certainly be unduly prejudiced by the re-prosecution of a case 
involving facts nearly a decade dormant.  
 
IV. 
 
Mendoza’s delay in pursuing relief was unreasonable 
and bars his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. For that 
reason and the others discussed in this opinion, the judgment 
of the District Court will be AFFIRMED. 
 
